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Description of the European bond marketAbstract 
We study the microstructure of the MTS Global Market bond trading system, which is 
the largest interdealer trading system for Eurozone government bonds. Using a unique 
new dataset we find that quoted and effective spreads are related to maturity and trading 
intensity. Securities can be traded on a domestic and EuroMTS platform. We show that 
despite the apparent fragmentation of trading, both platforms are closely connected in 
terms of liquidity. We also study the intraday price-order flow relation in the Euro bond 
market. We estimate the price impact of order flow and control for the intraday trading 
intensity and the announcement of macroeconomic news. The regression results show a 
larger impact of order flows during announcement days and a higher price impact of 
trading after a longer period of inactivity. We relate these findings to interdealer trading 
and to the structure of European bond markets. 
 
Keywords: Bonds markets, Microstructure, Order flow 
JEL classification: F31, C32 
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Non-technical summary 
In this paper we study the microstructure of the MTS Global Market bond trading system 
using a new and unique dataset consisting of detailed transaction data provided by the 
MTS group. This interdealer trading system is fully automated and effectively works as 
an electronic limit order market. The structure of the MTS trading platforms are very 
similar to the EBS and D2002 electronic trading system for the foreign exchange market, 
but different from the quote screen-based US Treasury bond trading system. The 
European bond market has also a much richer menu of bonds than the US market. 
Although the European capital market has integrated considerably in the last 5 years, 
mainly through the introduction of a single currency, European bonds can still differ in 
their credit rating. This varies from “AA2” for Italy to “AAA” for Austrian, Dutch, 
French and German bonds. 
An interesting feature of the MTS trading platform is its organizational setup. Fixed 
income securities can be traded on a domestic platform (like MTS France, MTS Germany 
and MTS Italy) but also on a general platform called the EuroMTS. Local system 
provides trading opportunities for trading “off-the-run” and “on-the run” securities as 
long as some liquidity restrictions are fulfilled. On the other hand, the EuroMTS platform 
offers trading in only “on-the-run” securities. In other words, the range of securities being 
traded on the domestic platform is much larger compared to EuroMTS. A bond trader on 
the domestic trading platform can therefore offer a much wider range of bonds to its 
clients making the EuroMTS platform redundant. We therefore ask ourselves: 
Are there any differences in trading costs between the EuroMTS and the domestic MTS 
trading platforms? 
Throughout the paper, we provide a comparison of the trading costs and price dynamics 
on these platforms. We calculate comparative measures of trading costs like the quoted 
and effective spread. We show that despite the apparent fragmentation of trading on 
domestic platforms and EuroMTS, the markets are closely connected in terms of 
liquidity. 
Another interesting feature of the MTS Global Market system is its pure interdealer 
characteristic. This allows us to study the price and order flow dynamics under 
competitive market making. The data also provides a detailed time stamp, which allows 
us to take trading intensity into account. In particular, we ask ourselves: 
Are interdealer trades better absorbed by dealers under high or low trading intensity? 
From the informational point of view, one can argue that a higher trading intensity will 
lure informed traders. These market conditions provides an opportunity for the informed 
traders to trade as much and as fast as possible without being detected. Hence, an 
unexpected trade in a period of high trading intensity will have a larger impact on the 
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January 2005price. On the other hand, one can argue that a low trading intensity makes it more 
difficult for dealers to control their inventory. Hence, dealers are more reluctant to trade 
when trading intensity is low and an unexpected trade during quiet periods have a larger 
impact on prices. To answer this question, a careful analysis of the price process is 
needed. Moreover, literature suggests that the impact of order flow on the price process 
during announcement days is much higher compared to days without news 
announcements. We apply a simultaneous modelling of price and order flow dynamics by 
taking trading intensity and news announcements into account.  
Our empirical analysis is conducted for the running 10-year government bonds of 
Germany, France, Italy and Belgium. We estimate the model using the full dataset and by 
separating the dataset into days with and without macroeconomic news announcements. 
We find that order flows are strongly correlated but the correlation gradually decreases 
over time. We also find that the impact of order flows is larger during announcement 
days. This supports the findings of the US bond market. However, when we take intraday 
trading intensity into account, we find that the impact of a trade in a relative low trading 
intensive environment has a larger impact on price than in a relative high trading 
intensive environment. These findings contrast the findings for stock markets and we try 
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January 20051 Introduction and Motivation
In recent years, the empirical work on the microstructure of ¯nancial markets has received con-
siderable attention in the academic literature. Most of the substantial empirical work in this area
pertains to stock markets. Given the emphasis on stock markets in the theory and the availability
of data, this is understandable. On the other hand, in terms of both capitalization and trading
volume, foreign exchange and bond markets are bigger than stock markets. Research on foreign
exchange and bond markets is also interesting because of their special structure. Both markets are
centered around a large number of professional dealers. Outside customers trade with the dealer
of their choice. Volume is high, and there is a lot of interdealer trading. The interdealer trading
is even bigger than the trading with outsiders. Lyons (2002) estimates that about 2/3 of the FX
trading is interdealer. Due to its obvious importance, empirical research on the microstructure
of bond markets has increased in recent years1. In this paper we study the microstructure of the
MTS Global Market system, which is the most important European interdealer ¯xed income trad-
ing system. This system is composed of a number of trading platforms on which designated bonds
can be traded. The trading system is fully automated and e®ectively works as an electronic limit
order market. The structure of the MTS trading platforms are very similar to the EBS and D2002
electronic trading system for the foreign exchange market, but di®erent from the quote screen-
based US Treasury bond trading system. The European bond market has also a much richer menu
of bonds than the US market. Although the European capital market has integrated considerably
in the last 10 years, mainly through the introduction of a single currency, European bonds can still
di®er in their credit rating. This varies from AA2 for Italy to AAA for Austrian, Dutch, French
and German bonds2. There are a few interesting features of this trading platform.
The ¯rst interesting feature of the MTS trading platform is its organizational setup. Fixed
income securities can be traded on a domestic and a European (or EuroMTS) platform. The
range of securities being traded on the domestic platform is however much larger than on the
EuroMTS trading platform3. A bond trader on the domestic trading platform can therefore o®er
a much wider range of bonds to its clients. Throughout the paper, we provide a comparison of the
trading costs and price dynamics on the domestic MTS markets and the EuroMTS by calculating
comparative measures of liquidity, such as quoted and e®ective spreads. We show that despite the
apparent fragmentation of trading on domestic platforms and EuroMTS, the markets are closely
connected in terms of liquidity.
The second interestingfeature of the MTS Global Market system is its interdealer characteristic.
1For example, Umlauf (1993), Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999), Fleming (2001) Cohen and Shin (2003) and
Goldreich, Hanke and Nath (2003) for the US Treasury market. Proudman (1995) for the UK bond markets,
Albanesi and Rindi (2000) and Massa and Simonov (2001a,b) for the Italian market.
2Based on Moody's credit rating.
3As an example, MTS France o®ers trading in a large range of French debt securities including the benchmarks
and highly liquid issues. On the other hand, EuroMTS only o®ers a smaller range of French debt issues.
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is a small but important collection of papers studying interdealer trading behavior. Ho and Stoll
(1983) were the ¯rst to discuss the role of competition between market makers. They argue
that market makers with the most extreme inventory will execute all the trades by quoting the
most competitive prices. Biais' (1993) theoretical model supports the ¯ndings of Ho and Stoll.
In addition, he shows that the number of suppliers of liquidity depends on the volatility of the
security and the trading activity in the market. Lyons (1997) analyzed the impact of a repeated
passing of inventory among dealers. He calls this phenomenon hot potato trading and shows that
the passing of inventory creates additional noise in the order °ow. There is also empirical evidence
documenting the passing of inventory among dealers. Manaster and Mann (1996) ¯nd that CME
futures °oor traders manage their inventory daily and that the most active sellers have the largest
long position. Reiss and Werner (1998) and Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998) studied the role
of inventory among market makers on the London Stock Exchange. They ¯nd an important role
for inventory control as most of these trades are used to reverse positions. In addition, the mean
reversion component of inventory changes over time and is stronger compared to the traditional
specialist markets as analyzed by e.g. Madhavan and Schmidt (1993).
Interestingly, these papers do not analyze the impact of these trades on price dynamics. In
particular, they do not ask under which circumstances (i.e. busy or quiet markets) these interdealer
trades are better absorbed by market makers. The literature suggests that the impact of order
°ow on the price process during announcement days is much higher compared to days without
news announcements. To answer this question, a careful analysis of the price process is needed
which in turn requires the simultaneous modelling of price and order °ow dynamics by taking
trading intensity and the announcement of news into account. This is the main objective of
the paper. The investigation of trading surrounding economic announcements in ¯xed income
markets has been analyzed by Fleming and Remolona (1999) and Balduzzi, Elton and Green
(2001). These papers ¯nd that the largest price movements arises during announcement days.
Green (2004) documented a lower adverse selection component before the announcement which is
a consequence of no-information leakage. After the announcement however, the adverse selection
component starts to increase because dealers absorbing a large portions of order °ow may have
superior information about short term price directions. This informational advantage will result in
a dispersion of information among dealers and an increase in information asymmetry in the market.
This rationale is fully consistent with the order °ow information models by Lyons and Cao (1999),
Fleming (2001) and Lyons (2001). Green (2004) also ¯nds that prices are more sensitive to order
°ow in a period of increased liquidity after a scheduled announcement. Cohen and Shin (2003) also
conducted a comparable analysis for the US treasury market. By dividing their dataset into days
with and without announcements, they ¯nd that the e®ect of trades on return is higher on busy
(announcement) days compared to days with relative low trading intensity. In contrast to Green
(2004) and Cohen and Shin (2003), we include intraday trading intensity in our analysis. We ¯nd
8
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¯nd that the impact of order °ows is larger during announcement days. This supports the ¯ndings
of Cohen and Shin (2003) and Green (2004) for the US ¯xed income market. However, when
taking intraday trading intensity into account, we ¯nd that the impact of a trade in a relative low
trading intensive environment has a larger impact on price than in a relative high trading intensive
environment. This ¯nding contrast the ¯ndings of Dufour and Engle (2000) and Spierdijk (2002)
for stock markets.
The setup of this paper is as follows. Section 2 starts with a description of the European Bond
market, the MTS trading platform and our dataset. Section 3 focuses on the study of liquidity,
measured by quoted and e®ective bid-ask spreads. Sections 4 analyzes the impact of order °ows and
trading intensity on the price discovery of the domestic and EuroMTS market in some important
10-year benchmark bonds. We estimate the model (i) using the full dataset and (ii) separating
the dataset into days with and without macroeconomic news announcements. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 Description of the European Bond Market and the Dataset
This section gives a short description of the organization of the European market for sovereign
bonds. The institutional environment of this market can broadly be divided into 2 sectors. The
primary sector decides upon the ¯nance policy based upon the funding requirement of each gov-
ernment. The operational activities for the implementation of these strategies is carried out by
various treasury agents like the Bundesbank for German securities, the French Tresor for French
securities and the Italian Treasury for Italian debt instruments. The secondary market decides
upon the trading environment. In particular, it determines the structure of payments and set-
tlements and the trading facilities o®ered by brokers and market makers. Both sectors in°uence
the price dynamics through supply and demand, where the primary sector acts as the ultimate
provider of liquidity. It is therefore useful to give a description of the Eurozone government bond
market based on these two sectors.
2.1 Primary Market
In a broad sense, the government bond market can be seen as the market for debt instruments
with a maturity running from 2 years up to 30 years. Although later we will focus on bonds with
a 10-year maturity, there is also a very active market for debt instruments with a maturity smaller
than 2 years. Here, the primary sector is special as it acts as the ultimate provider of liquidity
in a given government security. In the Eurozone money market, the European Central Bank is
the ultimate supplier of monetary liquidity in the Eurozone. In contrast, every member of the
Eurozone can decide its own ¯nancing operations and its supply of debt instruments. Hence, the
9
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the size of outstanding medium and long term debt which di®ers considerably across countries.
Despite the di®erences in issue size, governments choose to ¯nance their needs using debt paper
with almost similar maturities.
We now describe the bond market for German and Italian debt securities in more detail. We
pick these two markets as both markets are highly liquid while having di®erent credit ratings. The
German securities are rated `AAA' while the Italian securities are rated with the `AA2' status .
Germany The German market is the second largest bond market in the Eurozone and the fourth
largest market in the world, smaller only to the United States, Japan and Italy. The government
bond market has been given a strong boost since the uni¯cation of the two German states as East
Germany required large ¯nancing to modernize its infrastructure.
The issues of public authorities can be categorized in a few groups from which the highly
liquid Federal government bullet bonds are the most important ones5. In turn, the federal bonds
are categorized depending on their maturity. The most popular instruments are the long-term
government bonds (Bundesanleihen or Bunds) which have a maturity between 8 and 30 years, with
the 10 year bonds being the most popular. In addition to Bunds, the federal government issues
medium term notes which gained popularity since the beginning of the 1990's when foreigners
were allowed to purchase these notes. These medium term notes (Bundesobligationen or BOBL)
have a maturity of 5 years. In order to di®er between the well known 5 or 10-year bonds, the
German authorities introduced short term notes (BundesschÄ atzanweisungen or SchÄ atze) in 1991
with a maturity of 2 years.
Only the Bundesbank is authorized to issue federal bonds and it publishes a calendar with the
date, type and planned issue size for the next quarter. Federal bonds are issued on Wednesday
using tendering where some 80% of the whole issuance is sold. The remaining 20% is set aside for
market management operations and intervention. Only members of the \Bund Issuance Auction
Group" are entitled to participate directly during the auction. The participants have to quote in
percentages of the par value in multiples of 1 million euro with a minimum of 1 million euro. The
Bundesbank expects members to submit successful bids for at least 0.05% of the total issuance
in one calendar year. There are two ways in which a bond is auctioned. The ¯rst is through an
American auction, a competitive bidding schedule in which the participants announce the quantity
and price that they are willing to pay for the security taking a minimum price into account. The
participant with the highest price will be met ¯rst followed by the second highest price, and so forth.
The second method is through a Dutch auction, a non-competitive bid in which the Bundesbank
determines one price through the bidding schedule of the participants.
4Hartmann et al. (2001) provide an excellent overview of the EU money market.
5Other bonds are for example LÄ ander bonds and unity bonds
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Italian market is by far the largest European Bond market due to its large de¯cit in the government
budget. Since its approval of the Maastricht duty in 1991 however, the Italian government tightened
its economic and monetary policy to pursue an economic environment of stable prices and solid
public ¯nances. This has its in°uence on the performance of Italian securities. We can see this
in Figure 1 where the spread between the 10 year benchmark bonds of Italy is plotted against its
German equivalent7.
The most important medium and long term bond issued by the Italian treasury are BTPs
(Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali ). These are bullet bonds with a maturity of 3, 5, 7, 10 or 30 years
with coupons paid on a semi-annual basis. The vast majority of bonds in the Eurozone market are
bullet bonds with ¯xed coupons although some bonds are successful in the °oating rate market.
The Italian CCT bonds (Certi¯cati di Credito del Tesoro) for example are relatively successful just
like the French OATi bonds. Although both bonds pay a variable coupon rate, they are calculated
di®erently. The coupon of CCTs are based on the yield of the last issued 6 month treasury bill plus
a ¯xed spread while the coupon rate of OATi's are based on the level of the French price index.
Also, the coupon of CCTs are paid on a semi-annual basis while OATi's are paid on an annual
basis.
With respect to the primary auctions, the Italian treasurer announces its auction calendar for
the next year in September. The way these auctions are conducted for BTPs and CCTs is through
the Dutch auction mechanism, the same method also used for German securities. For the Italian
markets, members can post a maximum of 5 bids where the minimum acceptable spread between
the bids is at least 5 basis points.
2.2 Secondary Market: The MTS System
Let us now turn our attention to the secondary market. There are two ways in which bonds can
be traded in the secondary market of the Eurozone. The traditional way is through an organized
exchange were trading has been fairly low. The second way is through the OTC market in which
the main players are banks, most of them also participating in the primary auctions.
Of particular interest in the OTC market is the MTS (Mercato dei Titoli de Stato) system.
This system turned out to be successful by gaining a considerable market share since its creation
in 1988 by the Bank of Italy and the Italian Treasury. Nowadays MTS is managed by a private
company. The MTS system is an interdealer platform and therefore not accessible to individuals.
A recent quarterly bulletin by the Italian treasury8 reports that some 6.4 billion euro of BTPs were
traded on an average base in 2002 by the MTS trading platform. According to an older paper by
6According to the Italian treasury, the outstanding debt is around 1200 billion euro including debt issued by
state authorities.
7The word `equivalent' can be misleading as both bonds where not Euro-denominated before 1999.
8Quarterly bulletin-3rd quarter 2002
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The original MTS market was ¯rst introduced in Italy in 1988 in order to enhance trading
in the secondary market for Italian government bonds, which already existed as an over-the-
counter market. In order to improve market depth and activity, MTS was reformed in 1994 which
created the basis of the current MTS trading system. Privatization of the MTS system into MTS
Spa took place in 1997 and later in 1999 EuroMTS was created. In 2001, both EuroMTS and
MTS Spa merged into MTS Global Market, becoming the largest interdealer market for Euro-
denominated government bonds. Since the end of the nineties, the MTS system expanded to other
Euro-denominated markets and is now successfully operational in a number of other Eurozone
countries10. On these platforms only Government bonds and bills are traded. In April 1999 the
EuroMTS system was launched. This electronic trading platform provides trading in European
government benchmark bonds as well as high quality non-government bonds covered by either
mortgages or public state loans. The ¯nal stage of development of the MTS platform was the
creation of MTS Credit in May 2000 where only non-government bonds are traded. Although there
are di®erent requirements for participants depending on the market of operation, we can categorize
all participants either as market makers or as market takers. Market makers have market making
obligations as they have to quote all bonds that they are assigned to in a two-way proposal for at
least ¯ve hours a day. Table 2 gives us an overview of participants on the MTS trading system.
As we can see in this table, the largest part of the participants are market makers creating a very
competitive trading platform. The only exception can be found for the Italian market where more
than 60% of all participants are market takers. Most of the market makers are also active on both
platforms. With respect to the identity of the market makers, large market makers have access to
both markets while smaller traders tend to participate on the local platform11. The large numbers
of market makers active on both trading platforms suggest no competitive advantages in terms
of quoting rights. In the early years, the system knew full transparency, but in 1997 anonymity
was introduced in order to avoid \free-riding". Massa and Simonov (2001b) showed, by analyzing
MTS data before and after anonimity was introduced, that \free-riding" existed as the reputation
of a market maker had impact on the price process. The maximum spread of these securities are
pre-speci¯ed depending on liquidity and maturity. Proposals must be formulated for a minimum
quantity equal to either 10, 5 or 2.5 million Euro depending on the market and maturity of the
bond. In addition, a maximum spread of these proposals exist and is pre- speci¯ed depending
9The Italian Treasury and Securities Markets: Overview and Recent Developments. Public Debt Management
O±ce, March 2000.
10MTS is operational in Finland, Ireland, Belgium, Amsterdam, Germany, France, MTS Portugal and Spain. The
MTS system is also operational in Japan. Because we focus on Euro-denominated markets, we leave MTS Japan
out of our analysis.
11Financial institutions who are designated as marketmakers mustful¯ll some ¯nancial requirementswhich di®ers
among the platforms. For example, market makers for Belgian securities must have assets of at least EUR 250 mio.
For the EuroMTS, market makers must have assets of minimum net worth of EUR 375 million.
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according price priority and the time that they are sent (¯rst in ¯rst out). Odd lots are subject to
the market makers' acceptance. No obligations apply to market takers, they can only buy or sell
at given prices. The quoted proposals are ¯rm, i.e. every trader can hit a quoted proposal and
trading is guaranteed against that quote. E®ectively, the MTS system therefore works as a limit
order book. The live market pages o®ered to participants show the following functionalities:
² The quote page o®ered to market makers enables them to insert new o®ers. Posted proposals
can be modi¯ed, suspended or reactivated;
² The market depth page allows participants to see the best 5 bid and ask prices for each
security chosen together with its aggregated quantity.
² The best page shows for all products the best bid-ask price together with its aggregated
quantity;
² The incoming order page permits the manual acceptance within 30 seconds of odd lots.
² The super best page shows the best price for bonds listed on both the local MTS and the
EuroMTS. This will allow market makers with access to both markets to see the best price. A
market maker who has access toboth markets can choose parallelquotation, i.e. simultaneous
posting of proposals on the domestic and the EuroMTS platform.
² Live market pages shows for every bond the average weighted price and the cumulative
amount being traded sofar.
Remember that all trades are anonymous and the identity of the counterpart is only revealed
after a trade is executed for clearing and settlement purposes. The aggregated observed quantity is
the sum of all quantities chosen tobe shown by the market maker. Every market maker can post the
entire quantity that he is willing to trade (block quantity) or asmaller amount (drip quantity) while
taking into account the minimum quantity required. In the latter case, the remaining quantity will
remain hidden to the market. For example, a market maker who has a position of EUR 50 million
in a market where the minimum quantity is EUR 10 million can construct 5 drip quantities of 10
million. If we assume that he is the only market maker that time of the day, then the aggregated
observed quantity as observed by the market will be 10 million. On the other hand, the market
maker can post one block quantity of 50 million creating an aggregated observed quantity of 50
million euro. The MTS trading mechanism consist of two trading platforms where bonds can be
traded. For most securities, the market maker can post any prices on both the local MTS (like MTS
Belgium, MTS Amsterdam, MTS Italy and MTS France) but also a European system (EuroMTS).
12The longer the maturity the higher the spread. The maximumspread is notbinding. A marketmaker isallowed
to propose a quotation larger than this maximum spread. However, activities based on these trades are not added
to his performance record.
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o®ers trading in non-benchmark bonds as well. For example, 55 BTP bonds are traded on the
Italian market while just 11 of these bonds are traded on the EuroMTS system13. So at ¯rst sight,
the EuroMTS might seem redundant as all bonds being traded on this market are also traded on
the domestic trading system. However, the existence of both trading platforms suggests di®erences
and we therefore ask ourselves the following question: Why would a market maker with entrance
to the local platforms also would like to operate on the EuroMTS trading platform? In order to
answer this question, a detailed study on the costs and the dynamics of price formation is needed.
Before we start however, we introduce our dataset.
2.3 Dataset
Our dataset covers every transaction of Italian, French, German and Belgian government bonds
being traded on the MTS platforms from January 2001 until May 2002. The data records include
the direction of the trade (buy or sell) and a very accurate time stamp. These data allow us to
study a number of market microstructure issues in detail. Table 3 shows us the volume in the var-
ious markets including the number of transactions. A total of 867.901 trades took place re°ecting
more than EUR 4.9 trillion of market value. Here, the Italian bond market is by any means the
largest market in our dataset. Some 83% of all transactions stems from trading activities in Italian
securities. We also have trading data on the two largest AAA-rated bond markets in our dataset,
France and Germany. These countries have a trading volume of some EUR 460 billion and EUR
233 billion respectively.14 Although the German market is accepted as the benchmark for euro de-
nominated government bonds due to the large liquidity and its triple 'A' status, the trading volume
on MTS is fairly low. There are a few reasons for this. First, the EUREX Bond trading platform is
comparable to MTS system and o®ers trading in all ¯xed income instruments of the federal repub-
lic of Germany and sub sovereigns ¯xed income bonds of Kreditanstalt fÄ ur Wiederaufbau (KfW),
the European Investment Bank and the States of the German Federal Government. Second, the
existence of successful futures contracts on the EUREX and LIFFE has provided investors a low
cost margin based trading mechanism for all German bonds. For example, the Bund future is the
most traded contract in Europe with an average daily trading volume of some 800.000 contracts
on the EUREX re°ecting an underlying value of EUR 800bn on a daily basis15. The last bond
market that we study is Belgium with a trading volume of EUR 316bn. The most important bond
of the Belgian treasury are linear bonds, or OLOs as they are known after their combined acronym
in French and Dutch (Obligations Lin¶ eaire-Lineaire Obligaties). These are straight non-callable
13As of January 2003.
14Long term French bonds are divided into OATs, ¯xed coupon bearing bonds with a maturity between 7 and
30 years and in°ation linked bonds called OATi. Short term bonds have maturity between 2 and 5 years and are
called BTANs. All these bonds are calculated on an actual/actual basis with annual coupon payments.
15Source Eurex website. Every bund futures contract requires delivery of EUR 100.000 face value of a bond with
a maturity between 8.5 and 10.5 years at the moment of delivery.
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January 2005bonds with ¯xed -coupon and redemption value. Table 3 alsoshows the percentage of trading activ-
ity taken place on the local and European MTS platform. German securities are mostly traded on
the European platform together with the French medium term notes. Italian and Belgian securities
are rarely traded on the European platform as most transactions take place on the local platform.
The average trading size in Belgian, French and German long-term securities are quite comparable
with more than 7 million euro per trade while the average trading size in Italian securities stands
at 5.3 million euro. Because of the requirements with respect to the minimum lots being traded
we counted the number of 2.5, 5 and 10 million EURO trades. More than 95 percent of all trades
have either 2.5, 5 or 10 million of market value with the exception of the Italian securities, where
there is a relative large fraction of odd-lot trades. The most important reason for this di®erence is
the relative small size of the participants on the domestic Italian platform. Now we are ready to
calculate some di®erent measures of spread on both the EuroMTS and the local trading platforms.
If there are any di®erences in trading costs between both markets, this may justify the, at ¯rst
sight redundant, existence of the EuroMTS trading platform.
3 Liquidity on the MTS Market
Our ¯rst measure of trading costs is the volume weighted quoted spread (VWQS). This is a measure
of the depth of the limit order book associated to a speci¯c transaction size, and will re°ect the
implicit cost for an immediate transaction of a given size. We adapted the indicator of liquidity
that Benston et al. (2000) suggested for measuring the ex-ante committed liquidity of a stock
market organized like a limit order book. Let B0 denote the inside bid price and A0 the inside
ask price with Bh > Bh+1 and Ah < Ah+1 respectively. Let the euro amount of bonds o®ered or
requested at these prices be Qz
h with z = ask;bid and let the trade size be L = 5;10;25 million












































Table 4 reports the Volume Weighted Quoted Spread measure for class A, B, C and D benchmark
bonds for Belgium, France, Germany and Italy, on the domestic and EuroMTS platforms17. Our
¯ndings are that the quoted spread is similar across countries and for class A and B bonds, around
2 or 3 basis points from the best prevailing midquote. For class C bonds, the quoted spread is
16These transaction sizes are the most frequently traded in MTS Global Market.
17The estimates are based on data from 4-8 and 11-15 February 2002.
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class C bonds, probably because it includes the heavily traded 10 year BTP bonds. The quoted
spread is substantially higher for the longest maturity bucket D (13.5 to 30 years), ranging from 11
to 18 basis points, depending on maturity and country. This pattern is consistent with the ¯ndings
in Amihud and Mendelsohn (1991), who show that the bid-ask spread is higher in US treasury
notes compared to more liquid US T-bills.
An interesting ¯nding is that the market is very deep, i.e. the quoted spread for large orders
is only marginally bigger than the quoted spread for standard size orders. For example, for the
Italian 10 year benchmark bond the quoted spread for a standard 5 million trade is 3 basis points,
for a large trade of 25 million the quoted spread is still below 4 basis points. This pattern is similar
for the other bond classes and countries. In practice, trades larger than 10 million Euro are rare.
Observe that the quoted spreads on the EuroMTS platform are always slightly bigger than on the
domestic MTS platforms, but the pattern across bond classes and countries is exactly the same as
on the domestic MTS systems.
Of course, the quoted spread may include periods where there is little trading and may give a
inaccurate indication of actually incurred trading costs. Therefore, we also calculate measures of
the e®ective spread. The e®ective spread is de¯ned as twice the di®erence between the transaction






2It(pt ¡ mt) (3)
where pt is the transaction price, mt the prevailing midquote at the time of the trade, and It the
buy/sell indicator (It = +1 if the trade is initiated by the buyer, It = ¡1 if it is initiated by the
seller). In our dataset we do not always observe pt and mt exactly at the same time, but we select
the midquote that in time is closest to the time of the transaction. The realized spread compares






2It(pt ¡ mt+1) (4)
It is obviously not always the case that the trade price is above/below the subsequent midprice
for buyer/seller initiated trades, as the market may have moved. Therefore, the realized spread
measure may be negative.
Table 5 shows the estimates of e®ective and realized spread. The table shows that the realized
spread is always smaller than the e®ective spread. The numbers, however, are sometimes quite
large and the estimates of the e®ective spread are probably not very accurate due to the mismatch
in time between trade and midquote. Table 5 also provides the outcome of testing whether the
e®ective (realized) spread on the EuroMTS is signi¯cantly di®erent from the e®ective (realized)
spread on the domestic platforms. As we can see, there can be a di®erence in realized spreads but
this only occurs for a small number of bonds. We now turn to a ¯nal measure of the spread. We
16
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where j = ask;bid and z = bid;ask. Table 6 reports estimates of the spread based on absolute
price changes for the same menu of bonds as before. The results con¯rm the pattern that we found
for the quoted spreads. Estimated spreads are increasing with maturity, and on average are slightly
higher on EuroMTS. Moreover, the estimated spread of the long bonds is somewhat smaller in the
Italian securities compared to the estimated spread in Germany and France. Figure 2 shows the
same information graphically. Table 6 also includes a test to see whether there exist signi¯cant
di®erences between EuroMTS and the local trading platform. Some di®erences exist but the overall
conclusion is that spreads across the di®erent platforms are the same. Finally, we take a quick
look at intraday spread patterns. Figure 3 shows the intraday pattern of quoted spreads for the
most actively traded issue, the Italian 10-year bond. The quoted spreads shows a typical U-shaped
pattern, the trading day kicks o® with a relative large spread around 3 basis point in the early
morning, falling to 2 basis points in the late morning and gradually increasing to 4 basis points in
the late afternoon. Figure 4 shows the intraday pattern of e®ective and realized spread for the 10
year Italian bond. Again, a U-shaped pattern is being observed in here as well.
Summarizing these results, this section provided us some insights in the pricing behavior of
market makers on both the local and EuroMTS trading platforms. We conclude that the quoted
spread across countries is similar for bonds with a short maturity. For long term bonds di®erences
exist. At ¯rst sight, the data suggest that the quoted spread varies over time while being lower on
the domestic platforms. E®ective spread estimates based on transaction prices show a very similar
pattern across maturities. However, when testing di®erences in spreads between the domestic and
EuroMTS platforms, we ¯nd that di®erences exist for a few bonds and in general, both markets
are very integrated. Hence, there appears to be no di®erence between both markets with respect
to the quoted bid-ask spreads. The MTS order book for these benchmark bonds is also very deep
as the quoted spreads are only marginally di®erent for larger trade sizes. By analyzing intraday
patterns of the spread, we ¯nd that the quoted spread show a U-shaped pattern.
4 The Price Impact of Trading in Interdealer Markets
The analysis in the previous section provides us some useful insights in the trading costs on the
MTS trading platforms. A dynamic structure however will give us additional information. Our
data also contains the exact time of the days in which a trade occurs, giving us the opportunity to
take the trading intensity into account. The theoretical literature is not unanimous about the e®ect
of trading intensity on price dynamics. From the information based approach, one can argue that
17
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Hence, informed traders will trade when noise traders are active (Kyle, 1985) or trading intensity
is high (Easley and O'Hara, 1992). These papers argue that there exist a positive relationship
between information and trading intensity as more informed traders are active during high market
activity18. This means that any unexpected trade during active trading has a higher impact on
prices. On the other side, Diamond and Verrechia (1987) argue that informed traders always trade,
no matter what the nature of the information is as they can take long or short positions. However,
if short sale constraints exist, bad news takes more time to reveal resulting in lower market activity
or trading intensity. Hence, a longer period of trade absence increases the probability of facing
an informed trader with bad news who is constrained from selling short. Therefore, they expect a
negative relationship between information and trading intensity (more informed traders will trade
during low trading intensity) and hence a negative correlation between price discovery and trading
intensity (higher impact of trades arriving after a longer period of inactivity). More recently,
Dufour and Engle (2000) show for stock market data that a higher trading intensity is related
to stronger price impacts. This suggest that a larger trading size or trading intensity is likely to
be an informational event as the market maker increase its bid ask spread in response to trades.
The same results are reported by Spierdijk (2002). She shows using NYSE stock trading data
that, during trading intensive sessions, a new trade has a larger impact on prices. Before we start
with the introduction of the model, it is worthwile to give a reconcilliation of previous research on
interdealer trading.
4.1 Interdealer Trading: An Overview
Although the importance of competition between market makers has been known for a long time,
some in°uential papers like Stoll (1978), Copeland and Galai (1983) and Kyle (1985) focus on the
behavior of a single market maker. There is however a small but important collection of theoretical
papers on the behavior of market makers in a competitive setting. In these papers a crucial role is
played by inventory. Ho and Stoll (1983) analyze the impact of inventory on trading behavior and
argue that market makers having the largest long (short) position are ¯rst sellers (buyers). Biais
(1993) analyzed the equilibrium number of traders in a competitive market setup and shows that
the number of interdealer trades depends on the volatility of the security and the trading activity
in the market. He also ¯nds that the quoted spread around his reservation price is a decreasing
function of the inventory. This supports the ¯ndings of Ho and Stoll. Lyons (1997) focuses
speci¯cally on order °ow among dealers rather than inventory control. He ¯nds that the repeated
passing of inventory among dealers (the `hot potato' e®ect) creates additional noise in the order
18Kyle's (1985) model itself does explicitly make a statement about time as orders are aggregated. He does
however argue that informed traders prefer to trade simultaneously with noise traders in order to minimize the
chance of being detected. In Easly and O'Hara (1992) they argue that absence of trades re°ects no-news creating
a safer environment for a market maker to lower its spread.
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dealers to infer the true price of a security. There is also empirical documentation on interdealer
trading. Manaster and Mann (1996) use CME Futures transactions and ¯nd evidence that futures
°oor traders manage their inventory on a daily basis. They ¯nd that active sellers have most likely
the largest long position supporting the competitive dealer model of Ho-Stoll (1983). In contrast
to what inventory models predict, they ¯nd that an increase in the market makers position is done
at less favorable prices. This suggest that market makers not only provide a service to their clients
for providing liquidity, but also are active investors willing to increase their position to speculate.
Reiss and Werner (1998) provide a detailed study of inventory control among market makers on
the London Stock Exchange. Using trading data, they test several hypotheses with respect to
interdealer trading and ¯nd that 65% of all interdealer trades are used to reverse positions. This
suggests that market makers use interdealer trades to reduce inventory risk. Hansch, Naik and
Viswanathan (1998) also use trading data from the London Stock Exchange and ¯nd that the mean
reverting component in interdealer trades varies over time. There are periods in which inventory
moves stronger back to its long run average. Overall, they ¯nd that this mean reversion component
is stronger compared to the traditional specialist markets as found by e.g. Madhavan and Schmidt
(1993). This suggests that it is easier to manage inventory using interdealer trading.
Both the Reiss-Werner and Hansch et al. paper analyze the motives and characteristics of
interdealer trades but do speci¯cally analyze the impact of these trades on price dynamics. We
think that trading activity and order °ow are important in the price process. Speci¯cally, we
expect trades in an interdealer system during busy periods having a positive but smaller impact
on prices than during quiet periods for numerous reasons. The ¯rst reason are the searching
costs involved in inventory control. Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan's argument of changing mean
reversion in inventory depends on the searching cost for a counterpart19. To unwind a position,
a market maker can choose to wait until a trader enters the market or conduct an interdealer
trade. Hence, the market maker may choose to trade immediately through the interdealer channel
(paying the other market makers bid-ask price) or to wait (receiving his own bid-ask price). Hence,
the potential costs of market making is lower during busy periods as it is more likely that another
trader enters the market in a reasonable time avoiding the more costly interdealer trading. Closely
related to this point is the argument of Reiss and Werner who argues that the direction of trade
depends on the anticipation of a trade20 which emphasizes the importance of order °ows in the
19The cost of this sure execution is the fact that you cannot sell (buy) at your own bid (ask) price but at other
market makers ask (bid) price. These searching costs are already known from the limit book literature. See e.g.
Foucault et al. (2001) and Parlour (1998) and the references therein. This point was also pointed out by Flood et
al. (1999) in an experimental setting.
20They note that if a order is anticipated, then "interdealer trades will precede customer trades in the same
direction" e.g. if the dealer expects customer °ows of buy trades, he will also start buying in the interdealer
market. In contrast, if the order °ow was unanticipated, \follow up trades will move in the opposite direction" e.g.
unexpected customer buy trades will result in the interdealer sell trades.
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trades arrive frequently21. The second reason lies in the information value of order °ow. The type
of private information in government bond market however is fairly di®erent from the information
in stock markets, but comparable with the client based order °ow information found by Lyons
(1997) and Evans and Lyons (2002). These papers show that client based order °ows also has
a persistent impact on prices and market makers may therefore narrow their spreads to attract
customer °ows22 explaining the empirical ¯ndings of Manaster and Mann (1996). The information
acquired by market makers in these markets are long lived (compared to stock markets) and a
market maker who observes a great deal of order °ows can hold such information over time as
there is no need to exploit this unique information as soon as possible. Therefore, a trade after
a long time may be conducted by an informed trader. Moreover, Kaniel and Liu (2003) show
that informed traders tend to use more limit than market orders when information is long lived
resulting in a larger net supply of liquidity, smaller bid/ask spread and a smaller price impact of
trades. Closely related to this point is the additional noise that arise when inventory is repeatedly
passed among dealers using market orders. Lyons (1997) showed in a theoretical setup that the
repeated passing of inventory is harmful as it creates additional noise in the order °ow. Hence, in
order to avoid any sequence of hot potato trading, the impact of an unexpected trade in a quiet
trading environment may have a larger impact on the price than under a high trading environment
as this creates an incentive to pass the inventory to another market maker rather than to wait for
an incoming order.
In this analysis, it is also important to take the role of macroeconomic announcements into
account. Fleming and Remolona (1999), Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) showed that macroeco-
nomic news produces an important impact on bond prices as the largest price movements arises
in days with economic announcements. These papers ¯nd that before the announcement, trading
intensity and price volatility is low while bid-ask spreads are high. Green (2004) documented a
higher adverse selection component after the announcement of news and argues that this is due
to an increase in trading activity. Dealers absorbing a large portions of order °ow may have supe-
rior information about short term price directions. This informational advantage will result in a
dispersion of information among dealers and an increase in information asymmetry in the market.
This rationale is fully consistent with the order °ow information models by Lyons and Cao (1999),
Fleming (2001) and Lyons (2001). Green (2004) also ¯nds that prices are more sensitive to order
°ow in a period of increased liquidity after a scheduled announcement. The same pattern is also
documented by Cohen and Shin (2003).
Summarizing, order °ow and trading intensity play an important role in interdealer trading.
21Garman (1976) expects market makers to control the entering of traders by adjusting their bid and ask price.
He shows that there is less need to adjust the spread as traders enter the market on a frequent basis during high
market activity.
22This strategy has been addressed by Madhavan (1995).
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intensity as the ability to control inventory is easier during high market activity. At the same time,
the informational content of order °ow can be extracted and analyzed. It is therefore important
to take the role of these factors into account when analyzing the price process.
4.2 The Impact of Trading Intensity on Prices
In the previous section, we argued that in interdealer markets a reverse relationship between price
impact and trading intensity may exist. To test this empirically, we have to model price impact
by taking order °ow order °ow dynamics and trading intensity into account. We apply the VAR
model proposed by Dufour-Engle (2000). The m odel is a system of two dynamic equations, one
for price changes (returns) and one for signed quantities, with lagged values of both variables as
explanatory variables. This model allows us to analyze the interaction between order °ow and
returns in the form of impulse responses of a shock (an unexpected trade) to the trading process.
The main advantage of this model is the dynamic setup between order °ow and price return. This
is important for the reasons mentioned previously but also because market makers on the MTS
trading platforms are able to extract information from the live market pages of the system23.
Therefore, the process of market making not only depends on the concurrent price and trade but
also on the previous changes in price and order °ow. Lagged traded quantity is also important
as the MTS trading system allows the splitting of orders and it is likely that the observed order
book is the drip quantity instead of the total (block) quantity. Following Dufour-Engle, we make
the coe±cients a function of trading intensity, de¯ned as the reciprocal of the number of minutes
between two trades. We also make the coe±cients depend on the location of the trade, i.e. whether
the trade occurred on a domestic platform or on EuroMTS. Intraday data typically contain very
strong diurnal patterns. Engle and Russel (1998) documented higher volatility at the beginning
and end of the day with similar patterns for volume and spreads. In order to capture some of these
patterns, we correct duration for intraday seasonality. The exact procedure is as follows: we divide
our dataset in 17 intervals running from [8.30-9.00) to [17.00-17.30). Prior to estimation, we skip
the durations between market close and the next day's opening. Our indicator for trading duration
in interval ¿ is given by Tt;¿ which is the time in minutes between trade t and trade t¡ 124, t 2 ¿.
The trading duration is now corrected for diurnal patterns by dividing by the average trading
duration in interval ¿ as given by ¹ T¿.Although we use the term trading intensity throughout the
paper, we must keep in mind that this is inversely related to lnTt¡i. In other words, the higher
ln Tt¡i, the longer the duration was between trade t and t ¡ 1 and hence the lower the trading
23In the MTS platform, a market makerreceive marketupdateswith respectto cumulatives quantity (not signed)
and the weighted average price from the past 5 minutes in the running hour.
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where rt = 10000ln(Pt=Pt¡1) and Qt is the signed quantity in millions of Euro's of the notional
amount. Hence, Qt is negative when a `sell' occurred while being positive in case of a `buy'. The
coe±cients are a function of the duration since the previous trade (Tt) and a market dummy (Dt)
which takes the value 1 if the trade at t occurred on the European MTS and zero otherwise. Notice
that the equation for the returns contains a contemporaneous e®ect of the signed trade quantity.
For the identi¯cation of the model we therefore assume that the error terms are mutually and
serially uncorrelated.
4.3 Empirical Results
In the estimation, we truncated the lagged variable at p = 3. Because of the likely presence
of heteroskedasticity we report White heteroskedastic consistent standard errors for statistical
inference. Further details of the estimation are given in the appendix. In order to preserve space,
we focus our discussion on the Italian 2011 and 2012 bonds as these are the most actively traded
securities in our dataset. The estimation results can be found in Table 7.
4.3.1 Return Equation
The e®ects of trades on the quote revision rt are considered here and the most important set of




i, which are the signed quantity indicator, market
indicator and the interaction between signed quantity and duration. The interaction between
signed quantity and return is re°ected in the °r
i parameter. First, note that °r
0 = 0:105. This
indicates an instantaneous upward (downward) price movement when a buy (sell) order occurs.
The magnitude depends on the quantity being traded. Interesting are the results for the lagged
variables °2 = 0:004 and °3 = 0:003 which are both positive and signi¯cant at a 10% con¯dence
interval. Signi¯cant lagged e®ects of trading volume of price returns were also found by Manaster
and Mann (1996) for futures on the CME and they argue that this is consistent with active position
building. There is however not much variability in the quantities being traded as most trades are
executed in units of 5 or 10 million euro.
With respect to the market indicator, we ¯nd that ±0 = ¡0:025 is signi¯cant and negative while
all other lagged market indicators are not signi¯cant. This means that (ceteris paribus) a buy trade
at time t = 0, i.e. Qt = +1, has a lower instantaneous impact on price relative to the same trade on
the localMTS market. Recall that the dependent variable is 10000ln(Pt=Pt¡1) and the total impact
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or 0:4 basis points for a 5 million euro trade. On the other hand, the same trade has an impact of
0:53 basis points on the local platform resulting in a di®erence of approximately 0:13 basis points
return per EUR 5mio.
The zr
i parameter relates the change in rt and its own lagged values. Table 7 shows us that
its lagged variable is important and signi¯cant at a 10% con¯dence interval. The most important
parameter for our analysis would be ¿r
i as it indicates the interaction of duration and signed
quantity on return. Our estimates shows that the ¿ r
0 = 0:046 and ¿r
1 = ¡0:006 are signi¯cant. In
other words, the larger the quantity being traded, the stronger the instantaneous price reaction.
This reaction will be even stronger when trading intensity is low. The expected instantaneous
price reaction on a local market given a duration ln (¿¤) is given by (°0 + ¿0 ln (¿¤)) = 0:105 +
0:046ln (¿¤). On the other hand, ¿r
1 < 0 indicates an increase in price when the previous quantity
was a \sell" and a decrease in price when the previous order was a \buy". Because we ¯nd a
positive ¿ r
0 we argue that a transaction arriving after a long interval has a stronger impact on
trades than a transaction after a short interval. This is in contrast to the ¯ndings of Dufour and
Engle (2000) or Spierdijk (2002) who both ¯nd a stronger impact after a short time interval.
With respect to the results of the return equation for the other 2011 bond series25, we do ¯nd
di®erences between the domestic platform and EuroMTS in these markets; the ±0 parameter is
signi¯cant for Belgium (±0 = 0:067) and Germany (±0 = ¡0:226). This explains the fact that
Belgium bonds mostly being traded on the local market while the German bonds are traded on
the European platform. We do ¯nd a positive °r
0 for the other bond series, which runs from
0:007 for Belgium to 0:39 for Germany. The lagged variables °r
i are all not signi¯cant. We ¯nd
a signi¯cant ¿ 0 parameter for Belgium (¿0 = ¡0:047) and France (¿0 = 0:035). Note that the
Belgian parameter is positive which means that the impact of a trade during a period of high
trading intensity is larger.
Turning our attention to the 2012 bond series, we see that the reported results also for the BTP
2012 bond. Here ¿0 = 0:054 and again, a trade after a quiet period has a larger impact on price
compared to the same trade in a busy period. Again, ±0 is negative and equals 0:057 and the total
impact of a one million 'buy' trade on the EuroMTS platform is therefore °0 +±0 = 0:144¡0:057 =
0:087 or 0:44 basis points for a 5 million euro trade. The same trade has an impact of 0:72 basis
points on the local platform resulting in a di®erence of approximately 0:15bp. For the other 2012
bond series, we cannot ¯nd any signi¯cant ¿0 and ±0.
4.3.2 Quantity Equation
Let us now focus on the e®ect of trades on the quantity equation. As in the return equation, we
estimate the model using heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. Again, we base our discussion
25To preserve space, we do not present their estimation results. They are available upon request
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autocorrelation. The constant in our regression model is positive and signi¯cant di®erently from
zero. The °
Q
i parameters are all positive and signi¯cant. Hence, a buy (sell) order is likely
to be followed by some additional buy (sell) orders. This is also con¯rmed by the results of
Hasbrouck (1991a) and Dufour and Engle (2000). This e®ect is even stronger on the EuroMTS
platform for the BTP 2011 bond as ±i > 0 and signi¯cant for all lagged °ows. Interesting are the
estimates of the duration coe±cients ¿
Q
i which are negative and signi¯cant. The conclusion that
°
Q
i > 0 is that \buy" is likely accompanied by a another \buy" but the fact that ¿
Q
i < 0 re°ects
the fact that this likelihood will decrease when the time between the trades increases. In other
words, buy orders are likely to be accompanied with further buy orders but this pattern decreases
when duration is longer and activity is lower. This implies a weaker positive autocorrelation of
signed trades when trading activity is low26.
Because the estimation results for both 2011 and 2012 bonds suggest some interaction between
duration, signed quantity and price impact we test whether these coe±cient are jointly zero in the
return equation using a Wald test based on the White estimator. The results of this test is shown
in Table 8. Speci¯cally, we test whether ¿ r
0 = ¿r
1 = ¿ r
2 = ¿r
3 = 0, which is Â(4) distributed under
the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is rejected for the Belgian 2011 and French 2011 bonds
and the only time series being consistent are the Italian bonds.
Cohen and Shin (2003) also analyses the impact of trades on return for the US treasury market.
Their VAR estimations are based on di®erent subsamples of high and low trading intensity. They
¯nd that the impact on return on high trading intensive days is larger compared to days of low
trading intensity. However, their approach is somewhat di®erent as they do not take into account
the irregular time interval between observations and the diurnal patterns observed. Interesting is
their analysis of impulse response function for February 3, 2000 which was a very volatile day with
a lot of uncertainty in the market. The nature of this shock, which occurred the day before27, was
so unique that uncertainty still existed several days after. Our approach described above however
does not isolate volatile days, instead it averages the trading intensity throughout the dataset. It
is however interesting to see how trading responses to news. Our dataset is detailed enough to
incorporate the impact of macroeconomic news on the trading mechanism. We therefore divide
our dataset into a sample with no news and a sample with macroeconomic news anoouncements.
The same model is used and the outcome is the subject of our next section.
4.4 The Impact of News Announcements
We re-estimate the Dufour-Engle model for the Italian 2011 bond by incorporating news with
the highest trade impact by following the outcome of Fleming and Remolona (1999) and use
26These e®ects are also found for the BTP 2012 bond.
27On February 2, the Treasury announced the reduction of future supply in especcially the long end of the curve.
This resulted in a signi¯cant °attening of the curve in the 10-30yr area.
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Price Index, NAPM, consumer con¯dence and Fed fund target rates as these events are also
awaited anxiously by European bond traders and therefore may have an impact on trading. Let
us discuss the ¯ndings for °r
i (e®ect of signed quantity on return), ±
r
i (e®ect of trading platform
on return) and ¿r
i (e®ect of duration on return)29. Because we focus on the return equation, we
omit the superscript r. Our data could be divided into days with no news announcements (40043
observations) and days with news announcements (105 days, 20781 observations).
The e®ect of order °ow on return is re°ected by the °i parameters. First, the instantaneous
impact of an incoming order is the largest for days with news announcements and the smallest for
days without announcements (°
(news)
0 = 0:109 versus °
(no¡news)
0 = 0:104). The lagged variables
°t¡i are all positive but insigni¯cant30. The impact of a trade on return for the MTS and EMTS
platform can be analyzed through the ±i parameters. We ¯nd that ±0 is signi¯cant and smallest
during days without news announcements (±
(no¡news)
0 = ¡0:0253 versus ±
(news)
0 = ¡0:0223). All
other lagged market indicators appears not to be signi¯cant. Because this parameter is negative, it
means that the impact is smaller on the EMTS trading platform but the di®erence becomes smaller
during announcement days. Overall, the estimated magnitudes show that the instantaneous impact
of a trade on the EMTS during an announcement day is larger compared to a non-announcement
day and that its di®erence per EUR 5mio trade is 5 £ 0:008 = 0:04 basis point 31. Interesting
are also the ¿i parameters which re°ects the impact of duration on return. Our estimates are
positive, signi¯cant and larger for days without news announcements (¿
(no¡news)
0 = 0:049 versus
¿
(news)
0 = 0:043). It shows that the instantaneous price impact of order °ow is stronger in periods
with low trading intensity and this e®ect is even stronger in days without announcements.
We can conclude the following: The impact of trades are larger during days where news are
announced and this con¯rms the ¯ndings of Cohen and Shin (2003) and Green (2004) who con-
ducted a comparable analysis using treasury bonds. However, in contrast to their model, we also
make a distinction between intraday trading intensity under news versus no news announcements.
We ¯nd that, although the impact during days with news announcements is larger, the magnitude
becomes even larger when intraday trading intensity is lower.
28Speci¯cally, we use the European employment numbers, ECB meetings, Producer Price index, Consumer Price
Index, IFO survey, retail sales, gross domestic product, industrial production and consumer con¯dence.
29The tables with estimation results are ommited in here but available upon request.
30The exception is °
(news)
3 = 0:0065.
31Combining the results for ±0 and °0, we ¯nd that the impact of a trade on the EMTS per EUR1mio face value



















Working Paper Series No. 432
January 20054.5 Impulse Response Functions
In order to analyze the price and trade volume dynamics we calculate the impulse response function
using the estimated coe±cients for the local trading platform32. Speci¯cally, we are interested in an
unexpected shock in the signed quantities innovation and its impact on return and signed quantity
when an unexpected buy trade of EUR 5mio occurs in the market. Here, we use the average
trading intensity for analyzing the systems dynamics and the model changes into











iQt¡i + "1;t (7)










i Qt¡i + "2;t
which is the VAR model that Hasbrouck (1991) used. Again, we focus our discussion on the impulse
response functions of the Italian securities which are given in ¯gure 5 and 6. The ¯gures also shows
the impulse response function when a trade occur in a period with high trading intensity (straight
line) and in a period with low trading intensity (dotted line). In the high trading intensity case, we
pick a trade with Tt¡i;¿ on the 10th quantile and, in case of low trading intensity, we pick a trade
with Tt¡i;¿ on the 90th quantile. As we can see, the initial response at time t = 1 is much larger
during a period of low trading activity. The appendix gives us some details of impulse response
functions in these cases.
An unexpected buy trade results in a positive response as a buy will always be traded on the
ask side. Note that the initial impact of a buy trade is much larger when the market is quiet,
i.e. the time between trades is large and the lowest impact on the price process occurs when
trading intensity is high. As we can see in the ¯gures,an unexpected positive shock results in a
instantaneous upward price movement between 0:4bp to 0:6bp for the BTP 2011 and 0:4bp to 0:9bp
for the BTP 2012. The bid-ask bounds arises in the 2nd trade which will cause the impulse response
function to move downwards. However, the estimations suggested a positive correlation between
order °ows and a buy order is likely to be followed up by additional buy orders and the system
therefore does not instantaneous move back to its equilibrium, instead it takes approximately 9
trades before the system is back to its equilibrium. The permanent e®ect of a initial buy on
the price process is positive as shown by the accumulated response function. As we can see, the
permanent impact runs from 0:45bp to 0:9bp with a highest impact for periods in which trading
intensity is low followed by average and high trading intensive periods.
We also computed the impulse response functions taking announcements into account. As we
can see in ¯gure 7 and 8, the accumulated impact of a EUR 5mio buy trade has resulted in an
0:57bp increase in return in case when no news arrives and 0:64bp when news arrives. However,
32The appendix provides details on the calculation of the impulse responses.
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stands at 0:65bp for no-announcement days and 0:7bp for announcement days.
5 Conclusions
This paper o®ers some insights in the microstructure of the European government bond market.
This platform is the largest pan European interdealer system in which market makers are obligated
to quote two sides. Our analysis focuses on the benchmark bonds of Belgium, France, Germany
and Italy. An interesting feature of this market is that we have both a local and EuroMTS trading
platform where the securities can be traded. At ¯rst sight, the EuroMTS platform appears to be
redundant as the local markets provide a larger number of securities while attracting the largest
part of the order °ow. We analyzed a number of reasons which might explained the existence
of the EuroMTS platform. We ¯rst measured trading costs using static measures such as the
quoted spread, the e®ective spread and the realized spread. The results show that the spreads
in the bond market are very small, between 1 and 3 basis points for the issues with maturities
up to 10 years. The 30 year issues have somewhat higher spreads. The spreads are smallest
for the most actively traded issues such as the Italian 10 year bonds. For some securities there
are small di®erences between the spreads on the MTS domestic trading platforms and EuroMTS.
The domestic markets typically o®er slightly better spreads (both quoted and e®ective) although
di®erences are small, and if they exist, they turn into the local platforms favour. Any reasons
favoring the existence of the EuroMTS system cannot be based to di®erences in spreads or price
impacts of order °ow. We think that this issue traces back to the request of treasury agents to have
a domestic platform for monitoring rather than one dominant European platform. In addition,
although the local systems provides us a richer menu of bonds, some participants are willing to
trade only the benchmark securities.
We then turn our attention to the price impact of trades and trading duration. The interdealer
literature suggest that a key role is played by inventory control which depends on trading activity.
Speci¯cally, we argue that it is more di±cult to control inventory when trading activity is low,
increasing the search cost. Moreover, the information content of order °ow and the repeated
passing of inventory creates additional noise in the price process. We analyze price discovery by
adding parameters of trading intensity and lagged order °ows, using the Dufour-Engle model. The
results show that order °ow is an important determinant of price °uctuations on the bond market.
Also, trading intensity plays a key role. In contrast to ¯ndings for stock markets, we ¯nd a higher
price impact of trades after long durations, and lower price impacts when trading activity is high.
We also ¯nd that the order °ow becomes less correlated after long durations. Finally, we divided
our dataset into days with and without important news announcements and re-estimate the model.
We ¯nd that the impact of order °ows are much larger under days with announcements. This e®ect
is even magni¯ed under low intraday trading intensity. Finally, when analyzing the price impacts
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although the reported di®erences are very small. We therefore conlude that both trading platforms
are very much integrated.
A Econometric details
This appendix gives details on the econometric methods used in the Dufour-Engle model. Instead
of estimating model (6) per equation, we estimate the model as a dynamic simultaneous equation
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Here the Yt variables are endogenous as it contains the output of the system while Xt contains the
observable input variables and therefore being exogenous. The reduced form of the t-th equation
in model 8 is given by
Yt =
¡






















CiDt¡iQt¡i + F0 lnTtQt + vt (12)
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The error term is vt s N(0;¥v) where ¥v = (I2 ¡ G)
¡1 ¥" (I2 ¡ G)
¡10. The model as such is
not identi¯ed as we cannot track the structural parameters using its reduced form (12). This
identi¯cation problem arises as the reduced model is not able to identify the ¹ °r
0 parameter of the
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0 parameter can be interpreted as the instantaneous impact of an incoming trade on the
return residual and therefore on return itself and it must be strictly positive due to the bid-ask
price. Note that this contemporaneous correlation alsoimplies that we cannot analyze the dynamics
of the system by simply isolating a shock in the order °ow innovation "2;t as a shock in "2;t tells
us something about "1;t and hence about the dynamics of the total system. However, LÄ utkepohl
(1993) shows that the impulse response dynamics can still be calculated by simply multiplying both
sides of equation (8) with the upper Choleski decomposition of the residuals variance-covariance
matrix ¥v. Because or model contains AR-terms, it is useful to rewrite model (12) compactly in
its ¯nal form for estimation purposes
Yt = A (L)
¡1 [a + B(L)Xt + C(L)DtQt + F0 ln TtQt + vt] (15)
= Zt¤ + ut
where Zt = (¶2;Xt;DtQt;lnTtQt);¤ = vec[®;©1;©2;©3] and ut = A (L)
¡1 vtwhere the lag













©1 = A (L)
¡1 B(L) ;©2 = A (L)
¡1 C(L) and ©3 = A (L)
¡1 F0. The ¯nal form representation






and we calculate the joint density of the en-
dogenous variables using Maximum Likelihood. An illustration of this method is given in Hamilton
(1994).
B Impulse Response Functions
We now turn tothe details of the calculation of the impulse responses for the local trading platform.
One way of constructing the impulse response function has been suggested by Hasbrouck (1991b).
By making assumptions about invertability and covariance stationary components one can repre-
sent the VAR(p) model as an MA(1) model. The coe±cients of this MA model are then the quote
revision parameters. In our case, we take as a starting point the reduced form model (12).




















































We assume that the system at time t = 0 is in its long run equilibrium, i.e. no one is participating
in trades (Qt¡i = 0;i = 1;:::;P ) while market makers are not actively making the market (rt¡i =
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Qt is given by IR and is analyzed at time t+ n through the following expression
Ir (n;"2;t = ±;-t¡1) = E [rt+nj"2;t = ±;"t+1 = ::: = "t+n = 0;-t¡1] (17)
¡E[rt+nj"2;t = 0;"t+1 = ::: = "t+n = 0;-t¡1]
Here the ¯rst term of (17) re°ects the system when it has been hit only once by a shock ± at time
t while the second term assumes that the system stays in its long run equilibrium. Because both
terms are conditioned under the same information set -t¡1, it analyzes the realization of a system
which are identical up to time t. An important aspect pointed out by Koop et al. (1996) is the fact
that the impulse response function in linear models do not depend on the history of the information
set. This aspect is worth considering in our model as one can expect a di®erent impulse response
function for rt during di®erent trading intensity. We therefore apply two methods for calculating
the impulse response function as given by system (16).
The ¯rst method is by simply substituting the average trading duration for Tt¡i;¿ which is by





















i Qt¡i + v2;t
The second method that we apply in here is to compare the price impact of an unexpected buy
during periods of high and low trading intensity. We analyze the system under the situation that
a trade is conducted just once in a period of high and low trading intensity. To do so, we the 10-th
percentile trade based on the distribution of ¿high = [10:00¡ 10:30) am interval and the 90-th
trade based on the distribution of ¿ low = [17:00 ¡ 17:30)pm interval. On average, these intervals







t¡i;¿ = 10th ¡ percentile trade in interval ¿ = ¿ high (19)
T low
t¡i;¿ = 90th ¡ percentile trade in interval ¿ = ¿ low
As a result, the system changes again into a VAR(p) model
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Note that the dynamics of system (18) and (20) cannot be analyzed by simply isolating a
shock in the order °ow innovation "2;t. The reason for this is the contemporaneous correlation
between the residuals. Hence, as a shock in "2;t tells us something about "1;t and hence about
the dynamics of the total system. This is an important reason to use the MA(1) model as the
orthogonal innovations do not obscure the actual reaction towards the system. For example, both
(18) and (20) can be written as Yt = "t+
P1
i=1 µi"t¡i where the matrix µn has the interpretation
@Yt+n = µn@"t. Instead of this MA(1) approach, we continue to use the reduced form of
system(16) and follow the approach of LÄ utkepohl (1994), page 51, which requires the use of a
Choleski decomposition of the variance matrix.
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Table 1: Domestic government debt
Medium and long term governmentdebt oustanding (billion EUR). Source:ECB: The EURO Bond Market.








Table 2: Number of MTS market participants
The ¯rst column shows the total number of participants on the local market. The second column shows
the number of participants that have market making obligations while the third column shows the number
of market makers which are both market maker on the local and EuroMTS market.
Market Participants Market Makers Market makers (both markets)
MTS Amsterdam 31 22 21
MTS Belgium 28 19 19
MTS Finland 20 18 16
MTS France 31 31 30
MTS Germany 60 39 39
MTS Ireland 10 10 10
MTS Italy 140 38 33
MTS Portugal 23 19 17
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January 2005Table 3: Overview cash traded bonds
Description of our dataset in terms of trades and volume. The left part of the table shows the percentage
of trades conducted on the EuroMTS and on the local platform and the overall average trading size. The
Italian platform also o®ers trading facilities for German securities. The right part shows us the percentage
of total trades in the various quantity buckets. OLO, OAT, DBR and BTP bonds are long-term bonds
and the central focus of our analysis. All other bonds have either a medium or short time to maturity
Market Type Transactions Volume % EMTS ATS %2.5mio %5.0mio %10mio total
(%Domestic)
Germany DBR 14683 90033 56 (37) 6.1 3 75 19 97
OBL 9703 81184 67 (26) 8.4 0 46 49 95
BKO 7128 62385 72 (28) 8.8 0 39 57 96
Total 31514 233602
23.3
Italy BTP 518432 2851689 17 (83) 5.5 22 64 10 96
CTZ 43698 230281 0 (100) 5.3 69 11 8 88
CCT 139615 692323.5 0 (100) 5 66 10 9 85
BOT 27875 126218 0 (100) 4.5 69 17 5 91
total 729620 3900512 20.3
France OAT 33864 207018 41 (59) 6.1 8 66 24 98
BTNS 29472 252045 55 (45) 8.6 0 31 67 98
total 63336 459063 14.7
Belgium OLO 43431 316857 22 (78) 7.3 4 50 44 98
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Numbers shown are in percentage from midpoint of the best bid-ask price.
Class A Class B Class C Class D
Mts Italy
Trade size BTP 15/07/05 BTP 01/03/07 BTP 01/08/11 BTP 01/05/31
5 0.0199 0.0284 0.0270 0.1200
10 0.0230 0.0300 0.0291 0.1325
25 0.0288 0.0382 0.0350 0.1489
Mts France
Trade size BTAN 12/07/05 BTAN 12/07/06 OAT 25/10/11 OAT 25/10/32
5.0 0.0270 0.0252 0.0308 0.1255
10.0 0.0271 0.0256 0.0308 0.1373
25.0 0.0446 0.0300 0.0351 0.1554
Mts Germany
Trade size OBL 135 05/05 OBL 138 08/06 DBR 04/01/12 DBR 04/01/31
5 0.0307 0.0381 0.0330 0.1521
10 0.0343 0.0395 0.0354 0.1680
25 0.0393 0.0491 0.0397 0.1811
Mts Belgium
Trade size OLO 34 09/05 OLO 37 09/06 OLO3609/11 OLO 3103/28
5 0.0281 0.0299 0.0411 0.1407
10 0.0289 0.0300 0.0412 0.1504
25 0.0393 0.0339 0.0467 0.1657
Euromts: Italian government bonds
Trade size BTP 15/07/05 BTP 01/03/07 BTP 01/08/11 BTP 01/05/31
5 0.0225 0.0290 0.0280 0.1178
10 0.0245 0.0307 0.0300 0.1303
25 0.0292 0.0369 0.0363 0.1486
Euromts: French government bonds
Trade size BTAN 07/05 BTAN 12/07/06 OAT 25/10/11 OAT 25/10/32
5 0.0248 0.0248 0.0290 0.1249
10 0.0249 0.0254 0.0298 0.1380
25 0.0289 0.0310 0.0335 0.1576
Euromts: German government bond
Trade size OBL 135 05/05 OLB 138 08/06 DBR 04/01/12 DBR 04/01/31
5 0.0399 0.0380 0.0317 0.1523
10 0.0343 0.0400 0.0339 0.1626
25 0.0613 0.0495 0.0374 0.1784
Euromts: Belgian government bonds
Trade size OLO 37 09/05 OLO 3709/06 OLO36 09/11 OLO 31 03/28
5 0.0281 0.0299 0.0414 0.1386
10 0.0287 0.0299 0.0416 0.1482
25 0.0346 0.0344 0.0468 0.1648
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Table o®ers a comparison of the realized spread and the average e®ective spread. The e®ective spread
is de¯ned as the absolute di®erence between price and previous midquote. The realized spread is the
di®erence between the price and subsequent midquote. The T-statistics re°ects the outcome of testing
whether there exist a signi¯cant di®erence between the spreads on the domestics trading platform versus
EMTS.
Domestic EMTS Domestic EMTS
Maturity Bond E®ective E®ective T-stat (e®.) Realized Realized T-stat (real.)
BTP 07/05 0.018 0.018 0.128 0.000 0.005 3.544
A OBL 05/05 0.358 0.444 0.208 0.319 0.413 0.243
BTNS 07/05 0.032 0.019 0.753 0.012 0.002 1.601
OLO 10/04 0.010 0.013
BTP 03/07 0.026 0.029 0.634 0.003 0.006 0.108
B OBL 08/06 0.033 0.021 1.028 -0.002 0.026 2.207
BTNS 07/06 0.032 0.022 1.088 0.016 0.000 1.674
OLO 09/06 0.034 0.035 0.046 0.008 0.014 0.731
BTPS 08/11 0.038 0.041 0.674 0.004 -0.002 0.378
C DBR 01/12 0.044 0.044 0.023 -0.022 0.005 1.630
AOT 10/11 0.046 0.049 1.025 0.006 0.010 0.296
OLO 09/11 0.041 0.060 1.376 0.016 0.017 0.015
BTP 05/31 0.110 0.114 0.272 0.028 0.023 0.300
D DBR 01/31 0.143 0.138 0.104 0.021 -0.005 0.870
OAT 10/32 0.111 0.060 1.376 0.007 0.072 1.324
OLO 03/28 0.108 0.113 0.221 -0.065 0.094 1.083
BTP are Italian bonds, BTNS and OAT are French, OBL and DBR are German, OLO are Belgian bonds.
The Belgium October 2004 (OLO 10/04) is not traded on the EMTS platform.
Table 6: Spread for absolute price changes for domestic and EMTS trading platforms.
This table shows spread estimates based on absolute price changes for class A, B, C and D benchmark
bonds as a percentage of the price. We test Spread EMTS = spread domestic platform using a standard
t-test. The numbers in bold face re°ects signi¯cance at 5% level.
Class A B C D
Btp 15/07/05 Btp 01/03/07 Btp 01/08/11 Btp 01/05/31
Euromts 0.0335 0.0550 0.0496 0.1326
Mts Italy 0.0202 0.0338 0.0320 0.0839
T-stat 2.06 1.68 2.29 1.18
Btan 12/07/05 Btan 12/07/06 Oat 25/10/11 Oat 25/10/32
Euromts 0.0434 0.1038 0.0682 0.1754
Mts France 0.0492 0.0548 0.0758 0.3564
T-stat 2.33 1.20 0.45 1.61
Obl 135 05/05 Obl 138 08/06 Dbr 04/01/12 Dbr 04/01/31
Euromts 0.0378 0.0401 0.1699 0.1789
Mts Germany 0.0309 0.0376 0.0916 0.1618
T-stat 0.79 3.04 0.53 1.44
Olo 34 09/05 Olo 37 09/06 Olo 36 09/11 Olo 31 03/28
Euromts 0.0597 0.0439 0.0935 0.2631
Mts Belgium 0.0498 0.0560 0.0717 0.2827
T-stat 1.26 0.78 0.76 0.05
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Estimation of the Engle-Dufour model using Maximum likelihood. The standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity using White standard errors. The °0 coe±cient is calculated using the correlation
between the error terms. The left-hand side shows the estimation results for the return equation and the
right-hand side shows the estimation result for the quantity equation.
Parameters Coe±cient White S.E t-stat Coe±cient White S.E t-stat
return equation BTP 2011 Signed Quantity equation BTP 2011
¯1 -0.04200 0.01697 -2.47451 0.00169 0.01528 0.11036
¯2 0.01043 0.01071 0.97390 -0.04876 0.01530 -3.18679
¯3 -0.00765 0.00822 -0.92993 -0.06047 0.01517 -3.98730
°0 0.105
°1 0.00206 0.00232 0.89017 0.26106 0.00483 54.06128
°2 0.00447 0.00216 2.06620 0.06278 0.00502 12.51208
°3 0.00347 0.00190 1.83051 0.04636 0.00490 9.46441
z1 0.00573 0.01145 0.50029 0.02331 0.01070 2.17844
z2 -0.01628 0.00886 -1.83687 0.03130 0.01081 2.89564
z3 0.01225 0.00726 1.68867 0.04381 0.01076 4.07265
¿ 0 0.04616 0.00300 15.39971
¿ 1 -0.00599 0.00259 -2.31135 -0.04161 0.00487 -8.54999
¿ 2 -0.00291 0.00253 -1.15059 -0.04255 0.00488 -8.72268
¿ 3 -0.00418 0.00223 -1.87480 -0.03278 0.00476 -6.89203
±0 -0.02452 0.00262 -9.37369
±1 -0.00365 0.00248 -1.47361 0.01688 0.00869 1.94345
±2 0.00181 0.00286 0.63456 0.02826 0.00869 3.25090
±3 0.00480 0.00273 1.75676 0.03633 0.00869 4.18295
® -0.00471 0.00837 -0.56235 0.08477 0.02333 3.63400
Table 8: Wald test for duration e®ects
Wald test for the joint hypothesis ¿ 0 = ¿ 1 = ¿2 = ¿ 3 = 0. Under the nullhypothesis this variable is Â(4)
distributed.
Wald-statistic Wald-statistic
OLO 11 13.53 OLO 12 5.92
OAT 11 20.20 OAT 12 1.02
DBR 11 3.16 DBR 12 2.48
BTP 11 242.03 BTP 12 54.86
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Figure 1: Spread between the Italian 10-year benchmark bond (BTP) versus the 10-
year German Bund. The data of weekly observations runs from March 1991 until
December 2002. Source: Thomson Financials
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January 2005Figure 2: The estimated spread based on absolute price di®erences on the MTS
versus the EMTS. Data runs from 4 February 2002 until 15 February 2002.









Olo 34 09/05 Olo 37 09/06 Olo 36 09/11 Olo 31 03/28
Mts Belgium
Euromts










Btan 12/07/05 Btan 12/07/06 Oat  25/10/11 Oat  25/10/32
Mts France
Euromts




































Working Paper Series No. 432
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BTP 08/11 Domestic Market 2002: 

























Figure 4: The average e®ective and realized spread.
BTP 01/08/11 5.25% Italian Domestic Market 2002: 
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The impulse response functions for the Italian 2011 and 2012 bonds using average trading intensity
Tt¡i;¿= ¹ T¿ are given in ¯gure 5 and 6. By using the average duration, system (16) changes into a
linear VAR(p) model. Speci¯cally, the impulse response of the following system is analyzed:
















i Qt¡i + v2;t
The ¯gures also show the impulse response functions for the securities using a ¯xed maximum and
minimum trading intensity Tt¡i;¿= ¹ T¿, system (16) changes into a linear VAR(p) model. Speci¯-
cally, if taking time into account, we calculate the impulse response of the following system:






















i Qt¡i + v2;t










We calculate the response function of return given an unexpected buy trade at t = 0 of EUR ¯ve
million. The lower graph shows the accumulated response of return.
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Figure 6: Italian 2012 bond
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Figure 8: Italian 2011 bond (News announcements)
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